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In December of 1983, the  Mineral Trade and Markets Project spon- 
sored a task force meeting on the Economics of Mineral Exploration in an 
effort to  add to  the limited literature available on this topic. The eleven 
papers prepared for this meeting focus on two important questions: 
First, what are the important factors influencing the overall level of 
exploration, as well as its allocation by geographic area and mineral tar- 
get type? How important are mineral prices, political risk, new develop- 
ments in exploration techniques, and other factors in this regard? 
Second, has the  productivity of exploration been declining over time? 
Has it become more difficult and costly to find new mineral reserves 
because the easier to find deposits generally are discovered first? The 
papers are now being revised, and will eventually be submitted in an 
edited volume for publication. 
An earlier version of this study on the economics of Base and Pre- 
cious Metals Exploration by Major Corporations was among the papers 
presented at the task force meeting. It was prepared by Roderick G. 
Eggert, a Research Scholar a t  IIASA with an M.S. in Geochemistry and a 
Ph.D. in Mineral Economics from the Pennsylvania State University, and 
draws on research conducted for his doctoral dissertation. 
John E. Tilton 
Research Leader 
Mineral Trade and Markets Project 
Major private corporations are among the principal actors in the 
world of mineral exploration. This study analyzes changes in the level 
and distribution of base and precious metals exploration by a number of 
large North American and European firms over the last twenty years. 
It finds that  corporate exploration, like other forms of investment, 
responds to an interplay of economic, political, and technical factors 
influencing the expected revenues, costs, and risks associated with this 
activity. The level of exploration expenditure varies to a large degree 
with changes in overall expected returns, which are strongly influenced 
by changing mineral prices, discovery rates, and corporate goals such as 
diversification. The distribution of funds with respect to both commodi- 
ties and countries tends to vary with changes in relative potential 
returns. In the first case, relative mineral prices, discovery rates, 
advances in exploration and production technologies, new exploration 
models, and corporate goals such as diversification are important deter- 
minants of change. In the second case, geologic criteria, particularly 
recent discoveries in an area, are the most important determinants of 
change; the importance of government policies and political risks, 
although not trivial, has been exaggerated. 
Accordingly, corporate exploration works together with material 
substitution and other forms of technologic change to offset the cost- 
increasing effects of mineral resource depletion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Exploration is the search for new mineral wealth. It acts in concert 
with technologic change and other factors to augment mineral supply. 
Geological mapping, geochemical sampling, geophysical surveys, dia- 
mond drilling, and other exploration activities provide information about 
unknown resources. This information helps identify mineral deposits, 
thereby generating new mineral reserves. The new reserves provide ore 
for smelting and refining operations, which in turn provide unfinished 
metal to fabricators, who fashion products used ultimately by metal con- 
sumers. Exploration influencesthe availability and prices of minerals, 
the geographic location of mining and processing, and the international 
flow of minerals among producing and consuming countries. 
This study analyzes base and precious metals exploration by one of 
the important actors in the world of exploration--major corporations. The 
objective is to identify and assess the factors responsible for changes in 
the level and distribution of corporate exploration over the last fifteen to 
twenty years. Section 11 discusses exploration as an economic activity, 
providing a conceptual framework for the analysis. Section 111 looks a t  
levels of exploration expenditure and how they have changed over time 
for a number of North American and European companies. Section IV 
examines the distribution of exploration funds among minerals, paying 
particular attention to porphyry copper, massive sulfide, molybdenum. 
and gold and silver deposits. Section V analyzes the distribution of funds 
among countries, and in doing so examines the widely held belief that 
recent changes in this distribution have been determined largely by 
government policies and political risks. Finally, Section VI reviews the 
findings and discusses several of their implications. 
11. EXPLORATION AS AN ECONOMC A(rrZYrrY 
This study treats corporate exploration as an economic activity. As 
much as geologists might like to conduct exploration a t  high levels of 
expenditure purely for the advancement of knowledge o r  the sake of 
enjoyment, those who finance exploration view it as an investment. 
Companies will invest in this activity when expected net  returns, 
discounted appropriately for time and risk, exceed returns from alterna- 
tive investments, which include other ways of augmenting mineral 
supply, such as  purchasing a known deposit or using new extraction and 
processing techniques to improve productivity a t  existing operations. 
Variations in exploration activity should reflect, therefore, changes in 
the components of net returns--expected revenues, costs, and risks asso- 
ciated with exploration. 
What factors determine these components of net returns? Explora- 
tion revenues are the net returns that can be expected from subsequent 
development and mining of a newly-discovered deposit. They obviously 
are influenced by anticipated metal prices, output levels, and future 
demand, as well as development and . mining . costs, which in turn  are  
affected by a variety of considerations that  alter the productivity and 
prices of these factors of production (for example, mineral taxation and 
cost of capital). Exploration costs are influenced by similar considera- 
tions tha t  affect exploration productivity and prices for exploration 
goods and services. These considerations include government policies 
that  directly affect exploration, such as land regulations. Three types of 
risk are  distinguished here--political, economic, and geologic. Political 
risk reflects the variability in returns to exploration due to government 
actions. Economic risk reflects the variability in returns due to chang- 
ing commodity prices and costs of extraction and processing. Geologic 
risk reflects the  variability in returns due to the  physical nature of ore 
bodies, and it consists of two parts: variability associated with the proba- 
bility of any exploration target becoming an ore deposit, and variability 
in returns during production due to the physical nature of the  ore. 
In some instances, however, potential returns from exploration may 
be so difficult to estimate, because of the time and risks involved in dis- 
covering a deposit and then bringing i t  into production, that  changes in 
exploration's level and distribution may be determined to some extent 
by habit and simple rules of thumb, rather than by changing estimates of 
potential returns from exploration. 
III. LEYHS OF EXF'LORATION EXPENDITURE 
Figure 1 traces metal exploration expenditures over time for six U.S. 
firms, four Canadian Arms, and two groups of U.S. and European firms. A 
word of caution is in order: The data are riot completely comparable 
across firms. Data for the  U.S. mining company and the U.S. oil company 
were obtained directly from these unnamed firms and represent actual 
expenditures by the  corporate exploration group within the firm. The 
other figures are from published sources. Some data represent explora- 
tion expenses claimed for tax purposes on income statements, whereas 
others represent figures that are called exploration expenditures in 
annual report texts. The aggregate numbers for U.S. and European com- 
panies were tabulated by other authors according to their own defini- 
tions of exploration. 1 
' ~ a t a  for Phelps Dodge, the U.S. oil company, and the group of European companies do not 
include uranium expenditures. The other data undoubtedly include sizable uranium expen- 
ditures, but it  is not possible to exclude these from the totals. Expenditures for oil and gas 
exploration are excluded in all cases, with the possible exception of Asarco, whose data m a y  
include a small oil and gas component since 1980. The data from published sources include 
any expenditures for iron ore and bauxite, but such expenditures appear to have been rela- 
tively small or nonexistent for most firms. The U.S. GNP implicit price index has been used 
to deflate all expenditures and prices in this study, except where noted otherwise. 
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Despite these inconsistencies across firms, care has been taken to 
ensure that the data are as consistent as possible over time, thereby per- 
mitting analysis of exploration levels over time. 
Taken as a group, the curves display several common features. 
First, the general trend of real expenditures over time is upward 
(expressed in constant 1980 U.S. dollars). This is particularly true for 
the group of U.S. and European firms, and most of the individual U.S. 
companies. The upward trend is less pronounced for the Canadian firms. 
Second, expenditures tend to be cyclical. This is particularly true for 
the Canadian companies, dong with several U.S. firms. To a lesser 
extent. European expenditures have also been cyclical over time. Based 
on the data from this limited sample of major corporations, three recent 
boom and bust periods for corporate exploration can be identified, 
although not all firms exhibit all three periods. 
The first boom occurred in the early 1970s. most noticeably for the 
Canadian firms. Subsequent expenditures by the Canadians dropped 
sharply, while expenditures by the European companies leveled off after 
a period of steadily increasing expenditures. The second boom occurred 
in the middle 1970s--for three of four Canadian firms the peak year was 
1976, whereas for five of the six U.S. firms and the European group the 
peak was in 1977. 1978 and, to a lesser extent, 1979 were trough years. 
The third boom occurred in 1980 and 1981, followed by dramatic expendi- 
ture cutbacks in 1982. 
Despite these broad similarities, there are pronounced differences 
among firms. For example, expenditures by some firms change only gra- 
dually from year to year, whereas expenditures by others swing sharply 
over the short term. Expenditures by several firms have followed a gen- 
erally downward trend. a t  the same time that  the overall corporate trend 
has been upward. The factors that  account for these similarities and 
differences among firms are  considered below. 
Mineral pr ices  may be one factor responsible for much of the simi- 
larity among company expenditure trends. As will be discussed later in 
greater detail, mineral prices may be an important driving force behind 
corporate exploration expenditures by altering expected returns from 
exploration in two very different ways. f i rs t ,  they may strongly influ- 
ence expected revenues from exploration. Mineral prices are likely to  be 
an important determinant of expected future prices and thus revenues 
from mining, which in turn  are an important determinant of potential 
revenues and returns from exploration. Second, mineral prices may 
strongly influence exploration costs. They are  an  important deter- 
minant of mining revenues and levels of internal funds available for 
investment; if the cost of external funds is greater than the cost of the 
limited amount of internal funds, then mineral prices may be responsi- 
ble for changes in exploration costs. 
Figure 2 displays price trends for several major metals that  have 
been important exploration targets in recent years. By comparing real 
mineral prices (Figure 2) with real corporate exploration expenditures 
(Figure 1) over time, several qualitative inferences can be drawn. First, 
the general upward trend in expenditures. identified earlier, corresponds 
closely with the rise in gold and silver prices. Second, many of the  fluc- 
tuations in expenditures correspond with price fluctuations. For exam- 
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ple, expenditures by the  Canadian and several U.S. companies peaked 
and then fell in the early 1970s, following most mineral price trends with 
an approximate lag of one year. Copper prices peaked in 1970 and fell 
sharply i n  1971 and 1972, and lead, nickel, and silver prices also fell 
somewhat in 1971. Inco and Cominco expenditures peaked in 1970; Fal- 
conbridge, Noranda, and Homestake expenditures peaked in 1971 and 
declined in 1972, as  did Asarco's. 
The next price boom climaxed in 1974 for gold. silver, copper, lead, 
and zinc. Expenditures by most firms rose during the  mid-1970s. For 
three of four Canadian companies, the surge in expenditures lasted until 
1978. For five of six U.S. companies, expenditures increased substan- 
tially from 1975 to  1977. Likewise, expenditures by European firms rose 
from 1974 to 1977. 
In 1978, real exploration expenditures fell almost without exception. 
By this time, zinc and silver prices had  been falling steadily since 1974; 
copper prices had declined by almost one-third compared with t h e  1974 
average (despite a small increase in 1976); and gold prices had fallen 
during 1975 and 1976, recovering only slightly in 1977. 
Prices increased sharply in 1979 and 1980 for gold, silver, copper, 
and nickel (also for molybdenum, which is not shown on Figure 2). 
Almost without exception, corporate exploration expenditures rose shar- 
ply in these years. Although most prices declined markedly in  1981. 
most expenditures remained a t  high levels. I t  was not until 1982 tha t  
expenditures fell, as many mineral prices continued to  decline. 
This qualitative analysis suggests a very rough relationship between 
corporate exploration expenditures and lagged mineral prices. When the 
relationship is tested more rigorously by regressing real expenditures 
against an  eight-mineral price index, lagged one year, the results (Table 
1) provide some statistical support for the contention that exploration 
expenditures are related to mineral prices. In nine of twelve simple 
linear regressions, the  coefficient for lagged mineral prices is positive 
and significant a t  the 95 percent confidence level, using a one-tail t- 
statistic to  test  for significance. The mineral price index, described 
further in the Appendix, reflects percentage changes in real prices for 
the six minerals displayed in Figure 2, as  well as molybdenum and tin. 
These eight metals were selected because they represent the most 
important base and precious metals in terms of value of mine produc- 
tion. 
As introduced earlier, mineral prices may be an important determinant 
of exploration expenditures for two very different reasons. In the first 
case, i t  is argued that  mineral prices strongly influence expected reve- 
nues from exploration. They are an important determinant of expected 
future prices and revenues from mining, which strongly affect expected 
revenues and returns from exploration. Although a number of factors 
influence estimates of potential returns from future exploration and 
mining, including expected costs, demand, and other factors discussed in 
Section 11, i t  is only argued here that recent prices may be a very impor- 
tant determinant of such estimates. Many of the available price fore- 
casting techniques depend on recent price trends; other techniques may 
implicitly assume a correlation or other type of relationship between 
Table 1 
Regression Results: Exploration Expenditures Related to a Mineral Price 
Index Lagged One Year 
Constant Coefficient for n R~ 
lagged Price Index 
Homestake 
(1968-1982) 
Phelps Dodge 
(1972- 1982) 
St. Joe 
(1969-1981) 
14.13 
(a. 83) 
U.S. Mining Co. 
(1972-1982) 
U.S. Oil Co. 
(1968-1982) 
Cominco 
(1968-1982) 
Falconbridge 
(1968-1982) 
Noranda 
(1968-1982) 
12 U.S. F'irms 
(1972-1980) 
European Firms 
(1968-1982) 
-13- 
Table 1 (continued) 
Notes: 
n = number of observations. 
R' = coefficient of determination = the percent of the variation 
in exploration expenditures that can be explained by variations in 
the price index (lagged one year). 
* 
= significant a t  the 95 percent confidence level. 
* * 
= significant a t  the 99 percent confidence level (a one-tail t- 
statistic was used to test for significance because the coefficient is 
expected to be positive). 
Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. 
The method of Cochrane-Orcutt was used to correct for first- 
order autocorrelation. Checks were done with the Hildreth-Lu 
method to ensure that local solutions for rho had not been found. 
recent and future price trends, and they generally assume that  the 
underlying behavioral relationships governing price determination are 
maintained over time. Changes in exploration expenditures are likely to 
follow price changes with a short lag, because expenditures in any partic- 
ular year are  the result of a budgeting process that begins a t  least six 
months prior to the beginning of that  year. Changes in budget alloca- 
tions and expenditures for exploration in any year, therefore, are likely 
to reflect changing price expectations and to a lesser extent prices from 
the previous year. 
The second reason exploration expenditures may be related to 
mineral prices is that  mineral prices strongly influence exploration 
costs for some firms, because of their effect on mining income and the 
availability of internal funds for investment." This would occur when 
the cost of external funds (debt or equity) is greater than the cost of 
internal funds, as  shown in Figure 3. SSl is a supply curve for invest- 
ment funds, and the cost of using the limited amount of internal funds is 
approximately constant. As a firm calls on external sources of debt and 
equity for additional financing, however, costs increase as the firm's 
debt/equity ratio increases, or as additional stocks dilute management's 
control over the  firm (see Branson, 1979, pp. 219-220). DD is a demand 
curve for exploration funds. During periods of low prices and 
correspondingly low levels of internal funds, the equilibrium exploration 
expenditure corresponds to q l .  During periods of higher prices and 
'!he relationsXip between exploration expenditures and the availability of internal funds 
was suggested by Venture (1082, pp. 12-13), based on graphical similarities between explora- 
. . 
=on expenditures for some companies and corporate cash flow, lagged one year. 
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correspondingly higher levels of internal funds, the supply schedule 
shifts to the right, as depicted by SS,; in this case, expenditures 
increase to q2 ,  even though the demand curve for exploration funds has 
remained stationary. (Note that in the first argument concerning the 
relationship between mineral prices and exploration expenditures, 
mineral price changes cause a shift in the demand curve for exploration 
funds by altering expected exploration revenues.) Furthermore, cor- 
porate exploration involves a great deal of rivalry among competing 
exploration groups. and companies may be reluctant to call on external 
sources of finance, if it means divulging information about the explora- 
tion program that  they would prefer to keep confidential. 
For five companies in this study, exploration expenditures 
correspond closely with ne t  income, which is used to measure the availa- 
bility of internal funds. The graphs in Figure 4 imply a lagged relation- 
ship between expenditures and net  income, and this qualitative infer- 
ence is reinforced by the regression results (displayed in the figure) in 
the form of positive and significant coefficients for the independent vari- 
able, net  income lagged one year. 
Therefore, mineral prices appear to influence exploration expendi- 
tures in two very different ways--by influencing potential revenues and 
thus the demand for exploration funds, and by altering costs (through 
their effect on levels of internal funds) and thus the supply of explora- 
tion funds. Although both reasons contribute to the similarities among 
company expenditure trends, the second reason also helps explain the 
differences among company trends, because not all mineral prices move 
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together and not all companies produce the same minerals. Neverthe- 
less, mineral prices alone do not account for all similarities and differ- 
ences among firms. 
The l e v e l  o,f e z p l o r a t i o n  s u c c e s s  is perhaps the most important 
nonprice factor that  influences overall levels of expenditure by a com- 
pany. A period of successful exploration, when one or several mineral 
occurrences are  discovered, increases expected future returns to 
exploration, and a firm is likely to increase subsequent expenditures for 
two reasons. First, when a company discovers promising mineralization 
during reconnaissance or initial drilling, i t  is provided with a strong 
incentive to undertake a detailed drilling and evaluation program on the 
prospect. This detailed program is usually more expensive than recon- 
naissance exploration, and the result is an increase in total expenditures 
for the company. Second, after a company discovers or confirms promis- 
ing mineralization on one or several prospects, it may very well raise its 
estimates of potential returns from exploration in general and in 
response raise budget allocations and overall expenditures for explora- 
tion. A period of successful exploration enhances the bargaining position 
of the exploration manager when it comes to competing within the cor- 
poration for investment funds. 
In both cases, a company lowers its estimates of geologic risk, which 
reflects the probability of any prospect becoming a mine. A t  the  same 
time, a firm may also raise its estimates of potential revenues from 
exploration and mining. The result is an increase in potential returns 
from exploration, and the  company increases subsequent expenditures. 
During 1981 and 1982, for example, Asarco spent approximately $7 
million (in cur ren t  terms) on underground exploration on a promising 
gold prospect discovered in 1980 near  Timmins, Ontario, Canada; these 
expenditures account  for much  of the  increase in Asarco expenditures 
during these years. At St. Joe, detailed evaluation a t  two discoveries, El 
Indio (Chile) and  Pierrepont (New ~ o r k ) ,  may be partly responsible for 
t he  increase in St.Joe expenditures from 1979 to 1981. Furthermore, a 
steady stream of St. Joe discoveries throughout the 1970s, including the  
Woodlawn massive sulphide deposit in  Australia, the  El Pachon porphyry 
copper deposit in  Argentina, diamonds and  t in  in Brazil, gold in Califor- 
nia, and  zinc in Tennessee, may account  for t he  steady rise in  expendi- 
t u re s  during t h e  period 
Lack of success. on the  o ther  hand, may cause a company to lower 
estimates of expected re turns  a n d  thus  expenditures for exploration. At 
Phelps Dodge, for example, no significant discoveries were listed in 
annual reports between 1973 a n d  1978, and  during this period real 
exploration expenditures declined. In 1978 Phelps Dodge announced the 
discovery of porphyry molybdenum mineralization near  Pine Grove, 
Utah, and expenditures increased during 1979 and 1980, coinciding with 
detailed evaluation of this target.  
A second important  nonprice factor t h a t  influences overall levels of 
exploration expenditures is a change in corporate goals or philosophy. A 
decision to diversify production among a number of commodities is one 
such change. By successfully diversifying, a company lowers its expo- 
su re  to overall risk and increases t h e  present  value of i ts  activities. If a 
company believes t h e  best path t o  diversification i s  through exploration 
a n d  discovery of new mineral deposits, r a the r  than  through acquisition 
of known deposits, then it may reasonably decide to increase exploration 
expenditures. At St. Joe, for instance, annual report statements suggest 
that  efforts to diversify production away from lead have been partly 
responsible for increased exploration expenditures during the 1970s. A t  
the U.S. oil company, the general rise in expenditures from 1967 to the 
mid-1970s also reflects, at  least in part, a corporate desire for diversifi- 
cation. This company is one of a number of U.S. oil companies that have 
become increasingly active in nonfuel mineral exploration over the  last 
ten to twenty years. Realizing that  diversification into minerals produc- 
tion through exploration would take a number of years. this company 
was prepared to increase funding gradually for a few years, even if no 
immediate discoveries were made. 
A second major exploration decision that  a firm must make, in con- 
junction with how much to  spend on exploration, is what to explore for. 
This section examines how the  allocation of funds has changed over time 
for porphyry copper, massive sulfide, molybdenum, and gold and silver 
deposits and identifies several factors that  have been responsible for 
these changes. I t  then generalizes and describes a typical cycle in the 
exploration for any particular deposit-type. The section closes with a dis- 
cussion of the phenomenon of diversification that  has characterized 
many exploration programs in recent  years. 
Data from two unnamed companies, who provided historical break- 
downs of their exploration expenditures according to commodity or 
deposit-type, form the quantitative basis of this section. For gold and 
silver, data are available from five companies. The quantitative informa- 
tion is evaluated in light of additional evidence available from published 
sources about other companies. 
This section looks a t  the  role of changing relative prices in this allo- 
cation of exploration funds. and a word is in order about how relative 
mineral prices have been defined and calculated in this study. The rela- 
tive price for a mineral reflects how the  mineral's price has changed 
relative to other major mineral prices. In any given year, it has been 
calculated by dividing the mineral's price by the  mineral price index 
introduced in the  previous section. 
Porphyry Copper 
Porphyry copper deposits are  estimated to  contain 40 to 45 percent 
of world copper reserves (Gluschke, Shaw, and Varon, 1979, p. 45) and 
have been important targets for many exploration groups over the last 
twenty-five years. As shown in Figure 5, porphyry copper's share of 
overall exploration expenditures has declined markedly for both firms 
over the period 1972-1982. Porphyry copper's share for the industry as  a 
whole probably followed a similar declining trend, based on anecdotal 
remarks in trade journals and elsewhere (for example, Tremblay and Des- 
carreaux, 1978, p. 94; and Hodge and Oldham, 1979. p. 97). 
R e l a t i v e  
T r i c e  
a 1  
a  
e n d i t u r e s  
F i g u r e  5 .  P o r p h y r y  c o ~ p e r ' s  s h a r e  o f  t o t a l  e x p l o r a t i o n  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  f o r  two f i r m s ,  a n d  c o p p e r ' s  
r e l a t i v e  p r i c e .  
a To p r o t e c t  t h e  i d e n t i t i e s  o f  t h e  two f i r m s ,  
o n l y  a r a n g e  o f  p e r c e n t a g e s  i s  ~ r o v i d e d  i n  
t h e  f i g u r e .  
b ~ e e  t h e  A p p e n d i x  f o r  d e t a i l s  a b o u t  t h e  p r i c e  
i n d e x .  
The decline in copper's real price relative to the eight-mineral price 
index has roughly paralleled porphyry copper's decline in share of expen- 
ditures. One might reasonably infer that copper's declining relative 
price has been partly responsible for the fall in porphyry copper's share: 
as copper's price has fallen relative to other major metal prices, esti- 
mates of future prices and potential revenues have declined and copper 
has become relatively less attractive as an exploration target. 
Nevertheless, porphyry copper's changing share of expenditures has 
not completely followed changes in copper's relative price. In particular, 
porphyry copper exploration increased in importance during the period 
1978-1981, while the relative price of copper fell. This probably is due in 
part to rising relative prices for three metals commonly associated with 
porphyry copper deposits--gold and silver, whose relative prices rose 
dramatically from 1977 t o  1980, and molybdenum, whose relative price 
increased sharply from 1977 to 1979. As prices for the associated 
minerals rose, expected future prices presumably also rose. This, in 
turn, increased potential revenues from deposits containing the associ- 
ated minerals, resulting in an increase in the  relative importance of por- 
phyry copper exploration. A s  an example, in 1979 the oil company ini- 
tiated a substantial porphyry copper exploration program in South Arner- 
ica. at a time when relative molybdenum, gold, and silver prices were 
increasing. Since then, relative prices for all three associated minerals 
have fallen substantially, and the relative importance of porphyry copper 
deposits has declined for both erploratior? groups. 
In addition to falling relative mineral prices, three other factors 
may have been responsible for porphyry copper's declining share of 
expenditures. First, porphyry copper deposits were important explora- 
tion targets from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, and many discoveries 
were made, greatly expanding copper reserves. A number of known por- 
phyries are waiting to be brought into production. Accordingly, the possi- 
bility has declined for discovering lower-cost porphyry deposits than this 
existing stock of porphyries, in the absence of new ore deposit concepts 
or advances in production technologies. Second, capital and energy 
costs for large, low-grade porphyries may have risen more rapidly than 
similar costs for smaller and higher-grade metal deposits; real costs 
have increased as newly-discovered porphyries have declined in grade, 
been farther below the surface, and located in more remote areas (see 
United Nations, 1981, p. 17). Third, multimetallic deposits, such as mas- 
sive sulfides, appear to have gained in importance in many exploration 
programs because significant production of several metals can occur 
simultaneously. Companies have been attracted by the potential for sig- 
nificantly diversified production from one deposit, reducing fluctuations 
in earnings caused by price instability. 
Massive sulfide deposits, generally higher-grade and smaller than 
porphyry copper deposits, typically contain significant concentrations of 
copper, lead, and zinc and have received considerable attention from 
explorationists over the last twenty years. A s  shown in Figure 6, massive 
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sulfide's share of total expenditures for both firms declined moderately 
through 1974 and rose abruptly in 1975 and 1976. This increase in share 
for both companies appears to conform to an industry-wide surge in mas- 
sive sulfide exploration. As noted by Mullins, Lawrence, and Deschamps 
(1977, p. 105). "while porphyry copper lost its glamour, massive sulfides 
became a favorite of explorationists." Since then, however, massive sul- 
fide shares have followed significantly different paths for these firms. 
For the oil company, massive sulfide exploration has grown to be a very 
important part of its program. For the mining company, massive 
sulfide's share declined so that by 1980 it represented a very minor com- 
ponent of its overall program; by 1982, however, the share had grown to 
its highest level for the ll-year period. I t  is unlikely that relative 
mineral prices have been the major driving force behind the sharp 
changes in massive sulfide's share of expenditures. During this period, 
copper's relative price fell considerably, whereas relative prices for lead 
and zinc fluctuated around a generally declining trend. 
For the oil company, massive sulfide exploration developed into an 
important part of the overall exploration program during a period (1975- 
1977) when relative lead and zinc prices were generally steady or 
increasing. Since then, massive sulfide's share has declined somewhat, 
roughly paralleling the decline in relative prices. Nevertheless, the 
decline has not been greater because of the company's commitment to 
copper, lead, and zinc exploration. According to the exploration 
manager. the company remains committed to these commodities 
because they meet the following criteria: expected demand must be 
large and growing (or a t  least level), current production capacity must 
be insufficient to meet these demands over the next five to twenty years, 
and deposit-types must be large enough so that production will have a 
noticeable impact on the oil parent's income statement. The company 
believes that  profits can be made over the next five to twenty years from 
minerals that  satisfy these criteria, as long as deposits are found with 
low costs relative to current producers. Thus copper, lead, and zinc have 
been and remain an important part of the oil company's metal explora- 
tion efforts despite falling relative prices, because estimates of potential 
returns from production of these minerals have not diminished signifi- 
cantly. 
For the exploration industry as a whole, the apparent increase in 
massive sulfide's share of overall expenditures during a period when 
relative prices for copper, lead, and zinc were generally falling may be 
explained by several factors. First, for reasons discussed earlier, por- 
phyry copper exploration has been so successful that the possibility has 
declined for discovering lower-cost porphyry deposits than the  existing 
stock of porphyries; massive sulfides, with relatively lower capital and 
energy costs, have become an alternative target for copper. Second, 
massive sulfide deposits provide an opportunity for significant produc- 
tion of a variety of minerals, usually copper, lead, and zinc, and often 
minor amounts of gold, silver. and other minerals. By the mid-1970s 
many firms appear to have become very concerned about diversification 
of production among several commodities. as discussed earlier. Third. 
several significant massive sulfide deposits were discovered in the rnid- 
19703 that  created an excitement among explorationists about the possi- 
bilities of additional massive sulfide discoveries. The discoveries near 
Izok Lake (Northwest Territories, Canada), Timmins (Ontario, Canada), 
and Crandon (Wisconsin, USA) are but three of many examples. This suc- 
cessful exploration, the flurry of massive sulfide discoveries, undoubt- 
edly increased perceptions of potential returns from similar exploration 
and resulted in an increase in massive sulfide's share of expenditures in 
the mid-1970s. 
Molybdenum 
Molybdenum became an important exploration target for many 
exploration groups during the 1970s. As shown in Figure 7, molybdenum's 
share of 'mining company expenditures grew steadily from 1972 to  1978, 
remained fairly level through 1980, and has fallen precipitously since 
then. For the oil company, molybdenum exploration commenced in 
1979, grew substantially in importance during the next two years, and 
fell sharply in importance in 1902. For major corporations as a whole, 
molybdenum's share may very well have followed a similar path--steadily 
increasing share in the late 1970s, 1980, and in some instances 1981, fol- 
lowed by a drastic drop in share since then. During the same period, the 
relative price of molybdenum declined somewhat from 1972 to  1974, 
increased moderately during the next three years. rose sharply during 
1979 and 1980, and has fallen significantly since then. 
The factors encouraging increased molybdenum exploration in the  
late 1970s certainly must include rising relative prices, reflecting rising 
real prices. The spot price went from $2.90/lb. in 1975 to $9.22/1b. in 
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1979 and $22.00/lb. in 1980; in constant 1980 U.S. dollars, these translate 
into prices of $4.12, $10.08, and $22.00--an increase of over 500 percent. 
Another factor, related to molybdenum prices, that encouraged rosy per- 
ceptions of potential revenues from molybdenum exploration in the late 
1970s was the importance of the metal in many uses relating to energy 
production, a t  a time when energy-related exploration was booming. As 
noted by Distler (1981), molybdenum provides strength and corrosion 
resistance to  a number of alloys that are important in deep oil and gas 
drilling, enhanced recovery techniques, and Arctic conditions. 
The precipitous decline in molybdenum's share of exploration 
expenditures in the last year or  two appears to be largely the result of 
the current and potentially chronic state of excess mine capacity, 
created by new mines and recent discoveries. Examples include: Arco- 
Anaconda's mine near Tonopah, Nevada; U.S. Borax's Quartz Hill deposit 
in southeastern Alaska; Amoco's Thompson Creek deposit in Idaho; 
Exxonss Mount Hope deposit in Nevada; Amax's Mt.  Emmons (Colorado) 
and Mt. Tolman (Washington) projects, which have been put on hold; and 
the Phelps Dodge-Getty Oil deposit near Pine Grove, Utah. This specter 
of oversupply is reinforced by the potential for significantly more bypro- 
duct production of molybdenum from many porphyry copper mines. 
Gold and Silver 
Gold and silver deposits became important exploration targets lor 
marly companies during the 1970s and early 1980s. As shown in Figure 8, 
gold and silver's share of overall exploration expenditures has risen 
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dramatically in the last several years for five companies that  provided 
data directly to the study. Moreover, annual reports for other companies 
substantiate the trend: For example, Asarco, Homestake, Inco, and Ken- 
necott all report that  gold and silver constitute an increasing portion of 
their exploration expenditures. 
Gold and silver prices relative to other major metals have risen 
dramatically since the  early 1970s. Gold's relative price, displayed in 
Figure 8, experienced short-term highs in 1975 and 1980. Silver's rela- 
tive price has followed a similar but not identical path. Increased rela- 
tive prices have undoubtedly had a lot to do with the increased share of 
exploration expenditures devoted to gold and silver exploration, by treat- 
ing enormous expectations about potential revenues from future produc- 
tion of these metals. Two other factors, however, appear to have acted in 
concert with prices to  stimulate the recent boom in gold and silver 
exploration. First. as noted by Brown (1983). recent  improvements in 
heap leaching and carbon-in-pulp recovery of gold permit profitable pro- 
duction from the  low-grade ores that  are typical of many recent 
discoveries. Second, in a more limited sense the  desire to  diversify pro- 
duction among a number of minerals seems to have contributed to  the 
growing importance of precious metals exploration. St. Joe and Inco, for 
example. initiated sizable gold and silver exploration efforts as part of 
diversification programs. 
Finally, data from company D in figure 8 show how the interplay of 
prices and exploration success can influence a particular mineral's 
share of overall exploration expenditures. Gold and silver's share 
climbed from zero percent in 1972 to almost 20 percent in 1975, only to  
decline sharply in 1976. According to this company's exploration 
manager, the  initial interest in gold and silver exploration was primarily 
due to rising prices in the  early 1970s. The subsequent share increases 
in 1974 and 1975 were largely due to detailed drilling and evaluation of a 
promising gold prospect, which was detected during the  earlier explora- 
tion that  was stimulated by rising prices. In 1976. gold and silver's share 
fell sharply as the detailed evaluation was completed. In response to the  
drop in gold prices, the deposit was put on hold awaiting higher prices. 
Little, if any, new gold and silver exploration was initiated until 1980 
when the company responded to the  relative price increases of the previ- 
ous three years. 
The Episodic Nature of Exploration and Discovery 
I t  appears that  exploration and then discovery of particular 
minerals follow episodic or cyclical patterns over time. The following 
discussion generalizes from the  previous analysis in this paper and draws 
on work by Rose and Eggert (1983), which presents more detailed infor- 
mation on the  discovery of specific minerals. 
The idealized cycle begins with incentives for stepped up exploration 
for particular minerals. Initial incentives take a number of forms, 
including: 1) increased mineral prices and demand, which raise esti- 
mates of potential revenues from Future production, 2) new or revised 
geologic modelsS3 and 3) improved exploration and production 
3~ geologic model is an idealized set of geologic characteristics common to most or all d e p e  
technologies. The final two factors contribute to lower exploration and 
mining costs, and all three factors contribute to greater profitability 
than otherwise would occur. 
The cycle continues with a flurry of exploration activity, leading to a 
number of discoveries. The initial discoveries provide added incentives 
for more exploration over the  short-term, for reasons explained earlier 
in the paper. A bandwagon effect is often apparent: a successful leader 
or innovator in exploration is followed by a legion of imitators. Over the 
longer-term, discoveries of a particular mineral or deposit-type 
discourage further exploration by greatly expanding known sources of 
supply. This leads to  the final stage in the idealized cycle: declining 
exploration activity and discovery. Falling prices and demand also may 
contribute to the final stage. 
With regard to the minerals discussed earlier in this paper, the fol- 
lowing cycles can be identified. Porphyry copper exploration went 
through a long cycle t h a t  lasted From the mid-1950s to the  mid-1970s. 
Steadily growing copper demand and refinement of a geologic model of 
ore occurrence contributed to the  interest in porphyry copper deposits. 
Discoveries, the leveling off of copper demand, and increases in capital 
costs for porphyry deposits relative to  other deposit-types contributed to 
the falling interest. 
Porphyry molybdenum exploration, on the other hand, experienced 
a much shorter cycle in the  middle and late 1970s. Price increases, as 
well as optimistic projections of future demand and a geologic model, 
sits of a particular type. It is used as a guide for reconnaissance exploration and subsequent 
follow-up work. 
contributed to the boom. Falling prices and a spate of discoveries were 
primarily responsible for the cycle's e n d  
Gold and silver are in the midst of an exploration boom. Price 
increases appear to have been the boom's major determinant, although 
improvements in processing technology have been a contributing factor, 
as discussed earlier. 
Massive sulfides, in contrast to the other deposit-types looked at  in 
this study, appear to have experienced less pronounced exploration 
episodes. Nevertheless, there has been a small boom in recent years due 
mainly to the  opportunity for diversified production, lower capital and 
energy costs relative to porphyry deposits, recent discoveries, and a geo- 
logic model of massive sulfide occurrence. In addition, much massive 
sulfide exploration occurred during the 1950s in Canada following the 
development of airborne and ground electromagnetic techniques, which 
permitted assessment of large areas that lack rock exposure at the sur- 
face (Cranstone, 1983). 
Diversification 
An important element of many recent corporate exploration pro- 
grams has been diversification. Any analysis of how exploration funds 
have been allocated among commodities, therefore. would be incomplete 
without some discussion of this phenomenon. 
A primary purpose of diversification is to reduce fluctuations in 
earnings due to price instability. In addition. diversification into several 
commodities, such as gold and oil and gas, has been driven by price 
increases that  have raised potential financial returns from an invest- 
ment in these commodities. 
Before specifically discussing diversification of exploration pro- 
grams, it is important to realize that exploration is only one of three 
alternative means of achieving diversified production. The other options 
are to acquire a known deposit that then will be developed and brought 
into production, or to purchase an operating company. Most companies 
have used a combination of these three methods in their diversification 
efforts. 
The diversification of exploration programs has occurred on at  least 
four different levels. First, a number of companies that  prior to the 
1970s explored for a limited number of minerals, usually in the  vicinity 
of existing mines for minerals to extend the lives of existing operations, 
have broadened their programs to explore for a number of minerals in a 
variety of geographic and geologic conditions. For example, prior to the 
1970s St. Joe was primarily a producer of lead and zinc with operations in 
the United States, and most of their exploration efforts were aimed a t  
expanding the lead-zinc reserves of existing operations. During the 
1970s, St. Joe significantly increased exploration expenditures and began 
to explore for a much wider range of metals. They became a gold pro- 
ducer in Chile in 1979 (a St. Joe discovery) and California in 1980 (a St. 
Joe acquisition), and an iron ore producer in 1979 with the formation of 
the Pea Ridge Iron Ore Company. At  the same time, St. Joe also made 
diversification investments in energy resources--they purchased CanDel 
Oil Ltd. (1973). Massey Coal (1974), Tennessee Consolidated Coal (1978). 
and Coquina Oil Corp. (1977). Inco is another example of a mining com- 
pany that historically had a limited exploration focus, nickel, and now 
has a much broader focus, including gold and oil and gas. 
Second, as noted previously, multimetallic exploration targets, such 
as volcanogenic massive sulfides, have become increasingly important as 
companies have become more concerned about reducing fluctuations in 
earnings due to price instability. Multimetallic deposits enable diversifi- 
cation into more than one mineral, but require opening only one mine. 
Third, energy minerals, including uranium, coal, and oil and gas. 
have become increasingly important exploration targets for mining com- 
panies. Figure 9 shows how exploration for energy minerals has evolved 
over time for Amax and Phelps Dodge. Other mining companies to make 
sizable investments in oil and gas exploration in recent years include 
Asarco, Homestake, Newmont, Noranda, and as mentioned previously, 
Inco and St. Joe. 
Finally, in perhaps the most well known example of exploration 
diversification, metals have become important exploration targets for 
many major oil companies. Some companies, such as Exxon and Getty, 
entered metals exploration by forming new exploration groups within the 
company. Other companies, such as Arco, Pennzoil, and Sohio, relied 
primarily on acquisitions of existing companies t o  enter  metals explora- 
tion. Still other companies, such as Amoco, drew heavily on both 
methods. In many instances, oil companies were initially attracted to 
metals exploration by the lure of the  energy metal, uranium, and subse- 
quently expanded their programs to include other metals; Figure 10 
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displays this pattern for one oil company. 
V. LOCATION OF EXPLORATION 
A third major exploration decision that a company must make, in 
conjunction with how much to spend and what to look for, is where to 
explore. This section examines how the geographic allocation of cor- 
porate exploration expenditures has changed over time for Australia, the 
United States, and developing countries, after reviewing the results of 
previous research for Canada. It specifically asks the question how 
important are changing government policies and political risks in deter- 
mining changing geographic patterns of exploration investment. 
Although many factors presumably influence the location of 
exploration, including geologic potential and availability of infrastruc- 
ture, it  frequently is argued that  government policies and political risks 
are of overriding importance to  corporate explorers. For example, 
changes in Australian and Canadian policies in the 1970s concerning tax- 
ation, ownership, and other issues have been blamed for reductions in 
exploration there. For the United States, Barber (1981, p. 23) suggests 
that the 
greatest stimulus for expanding foreign exploration by U.S. 
companies ...[ is] our federal government. The precipitous with- 
drawal of our public lands prior to adequate evaluation of their 
mineral potential has provoked reduction or termination of 
domestic exploration programs. 
In developing countries, increases in political risk are often cited as the 
primary cause of what has been perceived to be a dramatic decline in 
recent corporate exploration there. For example, the Brandt Commis- 
sion report (1980, p. 155) states 
The mining companies place much of the  blame [for the  shift 
away from exploration in developing countries] on the instabil- 
ity of concession agreements in the Third World, and the ero- 
sion of what they regard as their contractual rights by national- 
ization. 
The rationale is that government policy changes raise or lower the 
costs and thus the investment attractiveness of operating in a country 
by providing incentives or disincentives for exploration and mining. 
Incentives take a number of forms, including tax holidays for new mines, 
exclusive exploration rights for large blocks of land, and concessionary 
power rates for mineral processing facilities. Disincentives include 
host-country ownership requirements, restrictive land and tax policies, 
and environmental regulations. Political risk, on the other hand, 
reflects the variability in returns due to government actions. Changes in 
perceived political risk alter the investment attractiveness of a country 
by raising or lowering the risk premium that  is required by firms to 
invest in an area and thus influence potential returns there. This sec- 
tion, therefore, examines the extent to which changing government poli- 
cies and political risks have been the driving forces behind recent 
changes in the geographic allocation of corporate exploration expendi- 
tures. 
Canada 
DeYoung (1977, 1978) studied the effects of Canadian tax law 
changes in the early 1970s on mineral exploration there, and his results 
provide some support to the  belief tha t  policies and risks are of consider- 
able importance t o  the location of exploration. By comparing trends 
over time in  mineral exploration in various Canadian provinces with 
neighboring regions, he  concluded tha t  the  major effect of tax changes 
was to shift the  location of exploration from one political region to 
another. 
The most striking example is British Columbia, where exploration 
expenditures, drilling footage, and claim staking declined in 1974 and 
1975, following the  introduction of particularly onerous provincial tax  
changes, including two layers of royalties; a t  the  same time, exploration 
appears to have increased in the neighboring U.S. states  of Alaska, Wash- 
ington, and Montana, and in the  Yukon and Northwest Territories of 
Canada, which as territories under federal control were not significantly 
influenced by federal-provincial t ax  battles (DeYoung, 1978, p. 31). At 
the international level, DeYoung (1977, p. 102) noted tha t  Canadian min- 
ing companies are  estimated to have spent  60 percent  of their explora- 
tion funds abroad in 1975, compared with 20 percent  in 1971. Neverthe- 
less, DeYoung admitted tha t  i t  is clearly impossible to separate the  
impact of changing tax laws from other factors tha t  affect exploration 
budget allocations, such as mineral prices and  geologic concepts. 
Australia 
In December 1972 the  Labor Party was elected to power in Australia, 
and as shown in Figure 11, private exploration expenditures declined in 
real terms over the  next three to four years. In December 1975 the 
Labor Party was defeated, the Liberal-National coalition returned 
to power, and since then exploration expenditures have risen steadily. I t  
has been argued that  changes in government policies and the associated 
uncertainty over potential future policy changes (that is, political risk) 
are largely responsible for these trends in exploration expenditure. 
Commenting in 1974 on the Labor government, Derry, Michener, and 
Booth (1974, p. 48) maintain "that the degree of uncertainty which now 
hangs over every aspect of mining and exploration in Australia has virtu- 
ally halted significant exploration and mining development." Three 
years later Mullins, Lawrence, and Deschamps (1977, p.104) wrote that 
"Australia is rapidly gaining in stature following the return to power of 
the Liberal-National Party coalition." 
Exploration expenditure data from four sources are used here in 
conjunction with other information to examine these and other changes 
in the level of expenditures and the share of overall exploration expendi- 
tures devoted to Australia. Although it is difficult to determine how 
much of any change in expenditures is due to  changing government poli- 
cies and political risks and how much is due to  other factors, if expendi- 
ture changes represent reactions to changing policies and risks, then 
one would expect the share of overall expenditures devoted to explora- 
tion in a country to  increase during periods of favorable policies and low 
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risks and to decline during periods of adverse policies and high risks. If, 
on the other hand, expenditure changes are unrelated to policies and 
risks, then one would expect the country's share of total expenditures to 
change in  response to  other factors. 
As shown in Figure 12, Australia's share of total exploration expendi- 
tures (measured as  the  percentage of expenditures devoted t o  explora- 
tion in ~ u s t r a l i a )  has varied widely over time for three  firms and a group 
of European mining companies. In general. Australia's share increased 
substantially from the  mid-1960s to  1973, declined from 1973 t o  1977 
(with the exception of the  oil company), increased t o  record levels by 
1980, and declined moderately since then. 
The increase in  share during the  late 1960s and early 1970s, 
displayed in the  European data, appears to be due largely to changing 
perceptions of Australia's geologic potential following a number of large 
mineral discoveries in areas previously believed to have little geologic 
potential. As discussed by Roberts (1977) and King (1973). significant 
discoveries of bauxite, manganese, lead, zinc, and particularly iron ore 
in the  1950s and early 1960s led to  renewed interest in Australian 
exploration. The initial impetus seems to  have been supplied by iron ore. 
King (1973, p.15) lists twelve important discoveries made between 1956 
and 1965 (out of twenty-nine total mineral discoveries in Australia), 
made in par t  because of "the recognition of the great  iron ore province 
in northwestern Australia" (Sullivan, 1974, p.20) and in part  because of 
the proximity of the  emerging Japanese steel industry, lying far from 
existing ore sources. During the  same period, the Weipa bauxite deposit, 
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the Macarthur and Woodcutters lead-zinc deposits, and the Groote 
Eylandt manganese deposit were discovered. 
A number of discoveries in 1966, most notably the Kambalda nickel 
region in Western Australia and several phosphate deposits in Queens- 
land, apparently sparked the exploration surge that lasted until the early 
1970s. King lists fifty-eight mineral discoveries made in Australia 
between 1966 and 1973, including fourteen nickel sulfide deposits near 
Karnbalda, in the area that, as noted by Sullivan (1974, p. 20), "was previ- 
ously considered a gold province, and any mention that nickel might be 
present was generally regarded with great skepticism." 
Returning to the effects of the Labor Party on metals exploration in 
Australia, it is readily apparent from Figure 11 that most of the decline 
in exploration expenditures occurred prior to the start of Labor Party 
rule in December 1972. Labor Party policies, therefore, could not have 
been directly responsible for most of the decline in exploration expendi- 
tures that occurred during the early and mid-1970s. 
Nevertheless, there may be some merit to the view that uncertainty 
over future policy changes. as well as Labor policy changes themselves, 
discouraged exploration in Australia relative to other countries. From 
1973 to 1977, Australia's share of exploration declined for the group of 
European mining companies and mining company #I. as shown in Figure 
12. The uncertainty surrounding the future of foreign-controlled mining 
investment in Australia resulted from a number of actions including pro- 
posed restrictions on foreign-owned equity. conflict between the federal 
and state governments over who owned the mineral rights in certain 
regions, establishment of the Takeover Review Board t o  approve any 
arrangements between Australian resource owners and foreigners, and 
the consent required from aboriginal people to work on their land in the 
future. 
Nonetheless, an equally-important cause of the decline in share 
appears to have been the success of exploration in Australia between 
1956 and 1973. By 1973, the exploration boom may have run its course-- 
that is, lacking important advances in exploration technology and con- 
cepts of mineral occurrence in Australia, significantly diminishing 
returns to additional exploration were reached. Moreover, the companies 
were worried about marketing what had been discovered already. As 
noted by Barnett (1980, p. 5).  "so much iron ore, bauxite, and nickel had 
been found there was little point in funding further exploration." 
From 1977 to 1980, Australia's share of exploration increased gen- 
erally for the three firms and the group of European mining companies, 
as shown in Figure 12. This resurgence began about a year after the 
return of the Liberal-National Party coalition. Although the coalition 
eased some of the adverse Labor government policies, most notably res- 
trictions on foreign-owned equity, there appear to have been other fac- 
tors contributing t o  renewed interest in Australian exploration. 
Australia's geology is particularly attractive for gold deposits. The large 
increases in gold prices helped create "gold rush" conditions in Aus- 
tralia, where gold has been perhaps the most sought-after mineral in 
recent years (Oldham, 1981, pp. 54,59). As an example, gold exploration 
represented almost 40 percent of the oil company's Australian expendi- 
tures in 1982, compared with zero percent in 1978. In addition, since the 
late 1970s firms appear to have adjusted to new ground rules for 
exploration in Australia and other places around the world, and are more 
willing to participate in joint ventures with local partners, even in 
minority positions. 
The United States 
A number of changes in U.S. government policies over the last fif- 
teen years, particularly land management regulations, are often cited as 
having made exploration and mining there less attractive relative to 
other areas. Concern over federal land management appears to have 
been especially high during two periods. First, in the mid-1970s the with- 
drawal of public lands in general from mineral development attracted 
much attention. In a much-quoted article, Bennethum and Lee (1975) 
estimated that  the percentage of public lands withdrawn from locatable 
mineral development increased from 17 percent in 1968 to 53 percent in 
1974. The frustration of many explorationists is exemplified by the fol- 
lowing quote from Mullins, Lawrence, and Lalande (1976, p. 91): 
the practice of withdrawing federal lands from exploration and 
mining has accelerated to the degree that by 1980, if continued, 
all public lands could be closed. 
Second, in the  late 1970s concern centered around the closing of some 
Alaskan lands to  mineral development, following several years in which 
Alaska was a favorite frontier area for many exploration groups (see for 
example, Mullins, and Lawrence, and Descharnps, 1977, p. 110; and Hodge 
and Oldham, 1979, p. 97). Many explorationists were disturbed by what 
they viewed as misguided policy. This frustration is evident in 
statements such as the following from Oldharn (1980, p. 46): 
By May 1979, 60 percent of land considered to be within high- 
potential mineral belts had been formally closed to exploration 
and mining, the more recent withdrawals apparently being 
aimed specifically a t  these activities, and one calculation a t  
this time indicated that only 17 percent of Alaska's total land 
area of 375,000,000 acres remained open to mineral explora- 
tion. 
Nevertheless, as demonstrated below, i t  is far from clear that U. S. 
federal and state policies have been on balance more onerous or restric- 
tive than policies in other countries. 
Figure 13 displays how the U.S. share of overall exploration expendi- 
tures has changed since 1970 for three companies. and Table 2 provides 
less complete data from three other firms. The figure and table reveal 
no common and distinctive trends that would allow definitive conclu- 
sions to be drawn. For the oil company, the U.S. share declined sharply 
in the early 1970s as the company initiated exploration efforts in Canada 
and Australia; the share fell gradually from 1974 to  1980, and then rose 
in 1981. At Amax, the large increase in the U.S. share in 1974 probably 
resulted from greatly expanded exploration for energy minerals in the 
U.S.; in the late 1970s, the share increased largely because of large 
expenditures on detailed exploration and evaluation a t  Mt.  Emmons 
(Colorado) and Mt.  Tolman (Washington) molybdenum prospects. Asarco 
expenditures devoted to U.S. exploration appear to have increased gradu- 
ally over the last ten years, although this inference is based on incom- 
plete data. At  Phelps Dodge, U.S. exploration has represented between 
one-half and two-thirds of nonenergy mineral exploration over the 
period. 
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Table 2 
United States Share of Exploration Expenditures for Three Firms 
(percent) 
Year Arn ax Asarco Phelps Dodge 
> 50 
ca. 50 
n.a. 
> 63 
n.a. 
n.a. 
> 60 
> 75 
ca. 75 
ca. 75 
n.a. 
n. a. 
ca. 50 
ca. 50 
n. a. 
ca. 50 
ca. 67 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
ca. 65 
ca. 50 
Notes: 
n.a. = not available. 
ca. = approximately 
Sburce: annual reports. 
For foreign exploration groups, on the other hand, one might rea- 
sonably conclude that U.S. policies on balance are very favorable for 
exploration, compared with policies elsewhere. According to Cook (1983, 
p. 121, 
the entry of foreign exploration companies into the U.S. will 
continue and possibly accelerate ... The attraction of the U.S. for 
exploration is the political stability and generous foreign 
investment policies. 
Exploration expenditures by Noranda in the United States have risen 
from 13 percent of total expenditures in 1971 to nearly 33 percent in 
1982. Finally, Consolidated Gold Fields, based in London, spent over 80 
percent of its direct or corporate exploration ( that  is, excluding expendi- 
tures by subsidiaries and partially-owned companies, such as Newmont) 
in North America, much of it in the United States (see Kramer, 1983). 
Nevertheless, these shifts toward the United States could just a s  well be 
due to other factors tha t  offset any adverse effects of policy. 
The implication, based on very incomplete analysis, is that  there  is 
no evidence to support the view that  on balance U. S. government poli- 
cies are any more onerous than those pursued by other governments, 
and they may even be more favorable than most. 
Developing Countries 
There is a widely held belief tha t  exploration by major corporations 
has declined markedly in developing countries in recent years as  a 
result of ill-conceived policies on the part of host governments and asso- 
ciated uncertainties regarding the potential for additional changes in 
the future. This has led to fears of future problems in mineral supply 
from developing countries. The purpose of this section is to assess the 
extent to which this proposition is true, using the limited amount of 
available evidence, and more generally to evaluate recent trends in the 
location of exploration activity in developing countries. 
A group of European mining companies has collected statistics on 
the geographic breakdown of exploration expenditures by member firms 
for the period 1966-1982 (for details about the group, see Crowson, 1983). 
As shown in Figure 14, the developing country share of overall explora- 
tion (excluding uranium) fell from 45 percent in 1966 to less than 20 per- 
cent in 1970, with the steepest decline occurring in 1970 (from 42 per- 
cent  to 18 percent). Since then the share has fluctuated between 9 and 
20 percent of total exploration expenditures. One might infer that 1970 
represents a watershed year in perceptions of political risk. 
Resource nationalism in mineral-rich countries had been simmering 
since the  early 1980s and appears to  have reached a head in 1970 in i ts  
effect on exploration. In Mexico, the policy of Mexicanization required 
that  "all new mining ventures including exploration had to be 51 percent 
Mexican," (Walthier, 1976, p. 46). even though operating mines had 20 
years to comply. In 1964, President Eduardo Frei of Chile called for 
nationalization of foreign-owned copper mines, which ultimately 
occurred following the election of President Allende in 1969 (the nation- 
alizations were not completed until 1971; see Moran, 1973). In Africa in 
the late 1960s, Zambia acquired controlling interest in its two largest 
mining groups. Anglo-American Corporation and Roan Selection Trust, 
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and Zaire nationalized Union Miniere's holdings there. 
Thus, one might expect the big drop in shares in 1970 to be reflected 
in expenditures in these areas, namely Latin America and Africa (exclud- 
ing South Africa). Nevertheless, the share of developing countries in 
Africa fell from only 3.7 percent to  2.5 percent in 1970, and the share of 
Latin America remained the  same (at 0.6 percent), whereas the big 
decline in the developing country share reflects primarily a decline in 
Oceania, excluding Australia, from 21.2 percent in 1969 to zero percent 
in 1970 (Oceania held 11.2 percent and 12.0 percent in 1967 and 1968, 
respectively). Radetzki (1982, p.41) maintains that  if the Bougainville 
copper project in Papua New Guinea is excluded from the statistics from 
1966 to 1969, the decline in developing country share is much less 
dramatic--from 40 percent to slightly over 30 percent. Thus, a large 
part of the decline in 1970 reflects the movement of one project from the 
exploration to development stage, and not necessarily increased percep- 
tions of political r i sk  
However. it is  impossible to  dismiss completely the role of govern- 
ment policies and political risks. The developing country share fell t o  9 
percent in 1972, while the  share of Europe (presumably a less risky 
investment area) increased to over 30 percent in 1972 from 20 percent 
in 1970. Moreover, since 1970 the developing country share has been 
consistently lower than it was during a large part of the 1960s. Although 
these trends cannot be attributed solely to one factor, the  resource 
nationalism of some developing countries in earlier years (highlighted 
above) must be considered a plausible contributing factor. Adverse pol- 
icy changes toward mining companies and the specter of possible future 
changes can do nothing but raise the  costs and risks and thus lower 
potential returns for a firm considering an investment in such a coun- 
try, other factors remaining the same. 
Nevertheless, there is some indication that  corporate exploration in 
developing countries has increased in recent years, as companies have 
adjusted to new rules for operating in many developing countries and as 
countries have moderated some of their views and policies. As discussed 
by Davies (1983), many developing countries seem to be more willing to 
adhere to the  provisions of a contract and to use national courts and 
international forums to  settle disputes, thereby lowering the risks to a 
company operating in a developing country. Joint ventures, quite rare 
prior to the 1970s, are  now commonplace, often involving several com- 
panies as well as  the  host government and offering a way of reducing the 
perceived risks of operating in a country. 
The developing country share of exploration by the group of Euro- 
pean mining companies increased from 9 percent in 1972 to 17 percent 
in 1982. Data from U. S. companies on their exploration activities in 
developing countries are much less complete than the data from the 
group of European firms. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 3, the  share of 
expenditures devoted to developing countries by a U.S. oil company has 
risen from 0.5 percent in 1975 to 10.2 percent in 1982, and this may be 
representative of an increasing share of expenditures in developing 
countries by U.S. oil companies in general since the mid-19'70s (Crowson, 
1983. p. 15). Porphyry copper exploration in Chile has constituted a large 
part of this expenditure in the last several years. 
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Table 3 
Developing Country Share of Exploration by a U.S. Oil Company 
(percent) 
Source: data obtained directly from company exploration depart- 
ment .  
This, in turn, appears representative of a trend toward increased 
exploration efforts in the Andean Cordillera, particularly Chile. A recent 
survey of large U. S. exploration groups by Barber (1981) indicates that 
70 percent of the respondents either had active programs in Chile or 
were definitely planning them, making Chile the third most preferred 
foreign country for exploration, after Australia and Canada. For the 
group of European mining companies, the exploration share of Latin 
America rose from 4.6 percent in 1976 to 13.1 percent in 1981, and most 
of this activity appears to have occurred in Chile and Brazil. 
What has caused the renewed interest in Chilean exploration? First, 
the Pinochet government has been much more receptive to direct 
foreign investment than was the Allende regime (which nationalized the 
foreign-owned copper companies in the early 1970s). A foreign firm in 
Chile can now own 100% of the equity in new mining interests, and new 
mining legislation. which became effective in December 1983, grants real 
property rights to foreign concessionaires (see Engineering and Mining 
Journal, 1984). Second, although Chile has long been geologically- 
attractive for exploration, several recent discoveries, including the Utah 
International-Getty Oil La Escondida porphyry copper deposit and St. 
Joe's El Indio gold-copper deposit, have stimulated exploration in areas 
that were believed to have relatively little geologic potential. 
Returning to the fear that  future mineral supplies from developing 
countries will be inadequate because of inadequate current exploration 
efforts there, the limited amount of data are clearly insufficient for mak- 
ing such an inference. The European data represent only part of overall 
corporate exploration expenditures. North American and other private 
corporations conduct significant exploration efforts in developing coun- 
tries, and some evidence suggests tha t  mineral exploration there by U.S. 
oil companies has increased since the mid-1970s. Furthermore, even if 
the developing country share of total private exploration expenditures 
has declined, exploration by public organizations, such as state-owned 
mining companies, may have partially replaced private exploration. 
VI. SlBMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Corporate mineral exploration responds to changing financial incen- 
tives, just like other types of investment. An interplay of economic, pol- 
itical, and technical factors influences expected revenues, costs, and 
risks, and thus expected returns from an investment in this particular 
activity. 
The level of exploration expenditures varies to a large degree with 
changes in overall expected returns. Mineral prices strongly influence 
these changes by affecting potential revenues and thus the demand for 
exploration funds, and by altering costs and the supply of funds, through 
their effect on the availability of internal funds for financing exploration. 
In addition, a company's degree of exploration success and corporate 
goals such as diversification influence potential risks and revenues, and 
therefore returns from exploration. 
The distribution of funds with respect to both commodities and 
countries tends to  vary with changes in re la t ive  expected returns. In the 
first case, relative mineral prices are an important consideration, 
through their effect on potential mineral revenues. But other factors, 
such as changing discovery rates,  advances in exploration and mining 
technologies, new exploration models, and corporate goals such  as  diver- 
sification, also influence expected returns and  may be equally responsi- 
ble for changes in this distribution of funds. In the  second case, 
although government policies and political risks are  an  important deter- 
minant of expected costs and  risks in a country, their  importance has 
been exaggerated. Geologic criteria, particularly recent  discoveries in 
an area. a r e  probably the  most important determinants  of changes in the 
geographic distribution of funds. Nevertheless, t o  the  extent that  
government policies and political risks discourage exploration in other- 
wise geologically and  economically attractive areas,  they  crea te  a nonop- 
timal distribution of exploration funds from the point of view of the world 
a s  a whole, unless other  actors in  the world of exploration, such  as s tate  
enterprises, successfully take over the  role played formerly by private 
corporations. 
Accordingly, corporate mineral exploration mus t  be viewed as  an 
activity tha t  competes for funds with other  forms of investment that  also 
serve to  augment mineral supply. Exploration is not intrinsically good; 
rather ,  i t  is driven by the  desire for lower-cost mineral production, and 
this goal can be reached by a number of means, including bet ter  produc- 
tion and processing techniques and further  geologic research,  a s  well as  
exploration. 
Furthermore, corporate exploration can be relied upon to  act  in a 
systematic way to help limit t he  effects of depletion of mineral 
resources, if prices of mineral commodities accurately reflect their rela- 
tive scarcity. As deposits of a mineral a r e  depleted, t he  mineral's 
relative scarcity and price tend to increase. As expected returns from 
the production of the mineral increase, incentives to carry out more 
exploration also rise. Assuming that  increased exploration leads to addi- 
tional discoveries, relative scarcity declines and the  specter of depletion 
subsides. Thus, to the extent tha t  exploration by major corporations is 
representative of overall exploration, exploration acts  systematically and 
in concert with material substitution and other forms of technologic 
change to help offset the cost-increasing effects of depletion. 
APPENDM: THE MINERAL PRICE INDM 
The mineral price index reflects percentage changes in real prices 
for the following minerals: copper, lead, zinc, gold, silver, molybdenum, 
nickel, and tin. Price changes are weighted according to the average 
value of mine production for the period 1971-1981. For each mineral, 
this average value was calculated by multiplying the 11-year average 
annual mine output by the  11-year average annual real price. Mine pro- 
duction figures represent production from market economy countries 
(that is, noncentrally-planned economies) and for all minerals other 
than molybdenum and gold were obtained from Metallgesellschaft, Metal 
Statistics 1971- 1981, 69th edition, 1982. Gold and molybdenum figures 
were estimated from U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, various 
volumes. 
As an  example, consider a hypothetical index with two minerals, A 
and B. Assume that  the  average value of mine production for A 
represents 75 percent and for B represents 25 percent of the total value 
of mine production in the  two mineral universe. If, in year t, A's price 
increases by 10 percent and B's price increases by 20 percent, then the 
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